O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/3 [S# 45] Page 128
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, And Department Of The East, From June 3 To August 3, 1863.
UNION CORRESPONDENCE. ETC.--#6Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:Have not yet received report from Milroy. General Kelley, here on his way, via Harrisburg, to New Creek, says before he left Harper's Ferry, at 1 o'clock this p.m., about 2,000 of Milroy's men had arrived. The rebels appeared before Winchester in four divisions, commanded by Ewell, Evans [?], Early, and Rodes, numbering 40,000. Milroy fought until 2 o'clock this morning, when he determined to evacuate and cut his way out. Spiking his guns and destroying stores, he marched some distance before his movement was discovered. He was then pursued, and attacked 6 miles from Winchester, and was shelled for several miles. His loss is probably 2,000 men, but that may be exaggeration. Will send, as soon as received, fuller and more exact report.
ROBT. C. SCHENCK,
Major-General, Commanding.
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BALTIMORE, June 15, 1863.
Major-General HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington, D.C.:An intercepted letter, written by a banker in Richmond to his wife in Baltimore, states that Lee has large re-enforcements from Charleston; has seized every horse, wagon, and mule in and around Richmond, and has three divisions of 30,000 each; that the attack on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad is a mere diversion; that he intends to cut a point in the Baltimore and Washington road, and that he also intends to go to Bush River, to get into Pennsylvania. The bearer of the letter also stated that Lee would move on Aquia Creek.
ROBT. C. SCHENCK,
Major-General, Commanding.
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BALTIMORE, June 15, 1863.
Brigadier-General TYLER,
Harper's Ferry, W. Va.:Orders were given last night for removal of hospital stores from Frederick. There is a panic there. Briggs, with his two or three remaining regiments, was drawn down to the Relay House this morning.
ROBT·C. SCHENCK,
Major-General, Commanding.
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BALTIMORE, June 15, 1863.
Brigadier-General TYLER,
Harper's Ferry, W. Va.:You will have to detail officers for the present for your staff. We have none to spare. Has General Kelley gone westward, as ordered this morning? The general commanding thinks that very important.
DONN PIATT.
Lieutenant-Colonel,
and Chief of Staff.O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44] Page 41
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 383.--Report of Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy, U.S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations June 1-15.
BALTIMORE, MD.June 30, 1863.
COLONEL: I have been compelled by the exigencies of public duties connected with my late command to defer until the present time a report of the recent operations about Winchester. Having no reports from brigade commanders, and not even an opportunity of conferring with them, I am still unable to give a detailed report. A sense of duty to myself and to the officers and soldiers whom I had the honor to command requires that I should submit some general statements.
I occupied Winchester with my command on December 25 last, and continued in the occupancy up to Monday morning, the 15th instant, when, for reasons which will appear in the sequel of this report, I was compelled to evacuate it.
When I first occupied Winchester, the Valley of the Shenandoah from Staunton to Strasburg was occupied by the rebel General Jones, with a force variously estimated at from 5,000 to 6,000 men, and constituted principally of cavalry. Imboden at the same time occupied the Cacapon Valley with a force composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, estimated at 1,500 men. These were the only forces by which I was in danger of being assailed, unless by a force from Lee's army, which, it was supposed, would be prevented from hostile demonstrations in my direction by the Army of the Potomac.
The object of holding Winchester was to observe and hold in check the rebel forces in the Valley, and to secure the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad against depredations.
Late in March, in pursuance of an order issued upon my own suggestion, I stationed the Third Brigade of my division, consisting of the Sixth Regiment Maryland Volunteer Infantry. Sixty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, First Regiment New York Cavalry, and the Baltimore Battery, at Berryville. Colonel McReynolds, of the First New York Cavalry, commanding. My instructions to Colonel McReynolds were to keep open our communication with Harper's Ferry and to watch the passes of the Blue Ridge (Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps) and the fords of the Shenandoah River known as Snicker's and Berry's. To this end he was to cause to be diligently scouted the country between him and those localities and as far south as Millwood. I was expressly instructed to undertake no offensive operations in force. Acting in accordance with these instructions, I kept my forces well in hand in the vicinities of Berryville and Winchester, excepting that during the expedition of [ar44/Page 42] General Jones into West Virginia, by order from your headquarters, I sent portions of them into that State. During my occupancy of Winchester, I almost continually kept out heavy cavalry scouts on the Front Royal road as far as Front Royal, and on the Strasburg road as far as Strasburg. My cavalry frequently drove the enemy's pickets as far up the Valley as Woodstock, and I held almost undisputed possession of the Valley as far as Strasburg until about June 1. By means of these cavalry expeditions, and information furnished me by Union citizens, I kept myself continually posted as to the rebel forces in the Valley under Jones and Imboden, and was at no time deceived as to their numbers or movements.
About June 1 the enemy became bolder, and small detachments of his cavalry were met as far down the Valley as Middletown.
On Friday, June 12, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there had been any accumulation of rebel forces in my front, I sent out two strong reconnoitering parties, one on the Strasburg and the other on the Front Royal road. The one on the Strasburg road consisted of the Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Thirteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, and one section of Battery L, Fifth U.S. Artillery, under command of Colonel Schall, of the Eighty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. This reconnaissance was conducted with energy, in pursuance of instructions, and its results were in every way satisfactory. The expedition proceeded up the Valley, the cavalry in advance, but within supporting distance of the infantry and artillery, until it had arrived within 2 miles of Middletown, at which place a messenger from Major Kerwin, who was in command of the cavalry, announced to Colonel Schall that a superior force of cavalry of the enemy had been discovered in line of battle immediately north of Middletown. The infantry and artillery were immediately concealed, the former in a dense grove to the right of the road and within 100 yards of the same, and the latter behind a ridge. Our cavalry retired, skirmishing with that of the enemy until he was drawn within reach of the fire of the infantry. Upon the first fire of our infantry the enemy retreated precipitately, followed by our cavalry, which pursued beyond Middletown.
In this affair the enemy lost 50 (as has since been ascertained) in killed and wounded, and we took 37 prisoners.
Colonel Schall remained on the ground for an hour, during which time his cavalry scoured the country in every direction, but could detect no traces of an accumulation of rebel forces.The prisoners taken all belonged to the Maryland Battalion and Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry, troops which had been in the Valley and on picket duty during' the whole period of my occupancy of Winchester. Besides, separate examinations of the prisoners disclosed that there was no accumulation of forces there. Colonel Schall made his report to me about 7 o'clock in the evening, and it relieved me from all apprehensions of an attack from the Strasburg road. It is now known that no portion of Lee's army approached Winchester from that direction.
The reconnaissance on the Front Royal road was abortive. The expedition consisted of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, about 400 strong, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Moss. It returned to Winchester about 3 o'clock in the afternoon on Friday. Its commanding officer reported that at Cedarville, a place about 12 miles from Winchester, he had encountered a large force of the enemy,[ar44/Page 43] composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. It did not appear, however, that he had placed himself in a position to ascertain the number or character of the force which he had encountered, or exercised the usual and necessary efforts to obtain that essential information. Officers of his command and reliable scouts who were present gave contradictory reports.
This report was discredited by myself and by General Elliott, my second in command. There was nothing in the report which indicated the presence of General Lee's army. It was supposed that the force on the Front Royal road could not be other than the enemy which we had faced during the occupancy of Winchester, or that the anticipated cavalry raid of General Stuart was in progress, against either or both of which combined I could have held my position. I deemed it impossible that Lee's army, with its immense artillery and baggage trains, could have escaped from the Army of the Potomac, and crossed the Blue Ridge through Ashby's, Chester, and Thornton Gaps in concentric columns. The movement must have occupied five or six days, and notice of its being in progress could have been conveyed to me from General Hooker's headquarters in five minutes, for telegraphic communication still existed between Baltimore and Winchester.
On Friday night I doubled my pickets and kept out strong patrols of cavalry on the leading roads, and I also sent a messenger to Colonel McReynolds, at Berryville, notifying him that the enemy was reported to be in considerable force on the Front Royal road. I instructed him to keep a strong party of observation in the direction of Millwood; to place his command in readiness to move at a moment's warning; if attacked by a superior force, to fall back upon Winchester by the route which he might deem most practicable, and that if his command should be needed at Winchester, he would be notified by four discharges from the large guns at the main fort at Winchester.
The whole forces under my command at this time were:
First Brigade, Brig. Gen. W. L. Elliott commanding--One hundred and tenth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Keifer; One hundred and sixteenth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Washburn; One hundred and twenty-second Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Ball; One hundred and twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Wilson; Thirteenth Regiment Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Galligher; Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, and Battery L, Fifth U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Randolph.
The Second Brigade, Colonel Ely, Eighteenth Connecticut, commanding-The Eighty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Schall; Twelfth Regiment West Virginia Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Klunk; Eighteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols; Fifth Regiment Maryland Volunteer Infantry, Captain Holton; Battery D, First West Virginia Artillery, Captain Carlin; Company K, First West Virginia Cavalry, Lieutenant Dawson, and Companies D and E, Third West Virginia Cavalry, Captain White.
The heavy guns of the main fortifications--consisting of four 20pounder Parrotts and two 24-pounder howitzers--were served by a company of the Fourteenth [First] Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, commanded by Captain Martins. The command numbered, according to Friday morning's return, 6,900 effective men.
[ar44/Page44]On Saturday morning, at a few minutes before 8 o'clock, my cavalry patrols on the Front Royal road reported that the enemy was approaching in force. Deeming it advisable that under the circumstances the whole command should be united at Winchester, I gave Colonel McReynolds the concerted signal above stated. I immediately sent forward on the Front Royal and Strasburg roads forces to observe and report the forces and movements of the enemy. That on the Front Royal road consisted of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Eighteenth Connecticut Infantry, Fifth Maryland Infantry, and one section of Battery L, Fifth U.S. Artillery, Colonel Ely commanding. A little over a mile from Winchester this force encountered a battery of the enemy's artillery, located in a wood at the right of the Front Royal road. After a short artillery skirmish, Colonel Ely retired his command to near the junction of the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, immediately south of and adjoining Winchester. The enemy did not pursue in force. Occasionally during the day small detachments of rebel cavalry approached from that direction, but were driven off by our infantry pickets, which were well protected, and directed to remain at their posts and act as skirmishers. The force on the Strasburg road consisted of the One hundred and tenth and One hundred and twenty-third Ohio, the Twelfth West Virginia Infantry, Thirteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, and Carlin's battery, Brigadier-General Elliott commanding.
A little to the west and adjoining Winchester is a high ridge, which extends from the town south for over a mile to Mill Creek, which is known as Apple-Pie Ridge. Around the southern terminus of this ridge the creek and a mill-race wind across the Strasburg road, and from thence in a northerly direction across the Front Royal road, and north of that road to Hollingsworth Mills, where the race terminates and the creek takes an abrupt easterly course. The whole length of the race is about 2 miles. The creek and race combined afford a strong protection against cavalry, and for that reason and the additional one that stone fences and other covers abound in its vicinity, they had been adopted as a portion of my infantry picket line.
The force above designated, excepting two sections of Carlin's battery, stationed on the southern extremity of the ridge above described, proceeded up the Strasburg road to within a short distance of Kernstown, where it remained, encountering no enemy, excepting occasional parties of skirmishers, until about 2 p.m., when Brigadier-General Elliott, through Lieutenant [William] Alexander, of his staff, reported to me at the place where the two sections of Carlin's battery were stationed that he could find no enemy in his front, but that there were indications that he was massing his forces on our left, in the vicinity of the Front Royal road. I then directed General Elliott to retire his force on the Strasburg road back to the creek and race above described, so as to put it in a position to support Colonel Ely on the Front Royal road or the forces in the forts, as the exigency might require. While this order was being executed, and when General Elliott's command had arrived within 600 yards of the creek and race, a considerable force of the enemy's infantry in two lines of battle displayed itself to our right, with the apparent intention to flank and cut off our retiring troops. I estimated the force of the enemy then in sight at 2,000.
The two sections of Carlin's battery on the ridge as above stated [<ar44/Page45] commanded the position of the enemy, and immediately opened on him with sufficient effect to throw him into confusion, when the One hundred and tenth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Keifer, and One hundred and twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Wilson, charged upon him and drove him back in disorder with considerable loss: Simultaneously the Twelfth West Virginia Infantry, Colonel Klunk, engaged a large body of the enemy's skirmishers in a woods south of the ridge and on the opposite side of the creek and race, and, after holding them in check some two hours, being outflanked and greatly outnumbered, retired. Our whole force, which had been advanced on the Strasburg road, retired behind the creek and race above described. That creek and race then constituted the line of our forces in front of the town, and was held by Colonel Ely, with a portion of his brigade, on the Front Royal road, and by General Elliott, with a portion of his brigade, on the Strasburg road. The remainder of my forces were in the forts immediately north of the town.
Immediately after our forces had retired from the Strasburg road to the Winchester side of the creek and race, the enemy advanced his skirmishers, and brisk skirmishing ensued until dark.
About 5 o'clock the enemy advanced and took possession of a picket post, surrounded by a stone wall on the south, east, and west, and which commanded the Strasburg road, from which they were dislodged by two companies of the Twelfth West Virginia Volunteer Infantry.
In this affair, which occurred about 6 o'clock in the evening, we captured a prisoner, from whom I learned that he belonged to Hays' Louisiana brigade, which was a part of Ewell's corps, the whole of which, and part of Longstreet's, was in our immediate vicinity. A deserter who came in shortly afterward confirmed his statement. This was the first intimation that I received that Lee's army had quietly retired before the lines of the Army of the Potomac, and performed a five or six days' march.
Telegraphic communication with my headquarters continued until 12 m. on Saturday. The Blue Ridge screened the operations of Lee's army from me. I had always relied with implicit confidence upon receiving timely notice by telegraph of its advance in my direction.
On Saturday, under cover of the night, I withdrew my forces on the Strasburg and Front Royal roads in front of Winchester to the southern suburbs of the town, under orders to retire to the forts north of the town at 2 o'clock in the morning.
Colonel McReynolds arrived with his command between 9 and 10 p.m., and was assigned to the star fort, immediately north of the main fortification. At this time it was evident that at least two corps of Lee's army, numbering not less than 50,000 men, and abundantly supplied with artillery, were in my immediate vicinity, and that my retreat by the Martinsburg and Berryville roads was cut off. I still hoped that there had been some corresponding action of the Army of the Potomac, and that if I could sustain myself for twenty-four hours I would be relieved.
Early on Sunday morning detachments of cavalry were sent out on the Berryville and Martinsburg roads, but were driven back by the enemy's skirmishers and sharpshooters.
From 7 o'clock on Sunday morning until 4 o'clock in the afternoon detachments of the Eighteenth Connecticut, Fifth Maryland, and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, under the direction [ar44/Page46] of Colonel Ely, continually skirmished with the enemy in front of the forts and east of the town, between the Front Royal and Martinsburg roads. During this skirmishing the rebels took possession of a large brick dwelling, surrounded by dense shrubbery, on the Berryville road, about half a mile from Winchester. Our skirmishers attacked and carried the house, killing 1 officer and 5 men and capturing 11 prisoners.
At one time during the day the rebels in considerable numbers appeared in the town, but were driven out by the Eighteenth Connecticut and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry.
On Sunday morning General Elliott, with a portion of his brigade, Carlin's battery, and the Twelfth West Virginia Volunteer Infantry, took position on the ridge above described, about a quarter of a mile south of the Romney road. He had frequent and sometimes severe skirmishing. The enemy did not, however, at any time appear before him in force.
In consequence of the overwhelming masses of the enemy about me, I kept my forces during the day well in hand and in immediate connection with the forts.
As early as Saturday evening, after I learned of the presence of Lee's army in force, I made up my mind to act on the defensive, economize my forces, wait until the enemy had massed himself for the final attack, and then, unless relieved, force my way through what might appear to be the weakest portion of his lines. My belief was superinduced by the maneuvers of the enemy on Saturday and by the ground that the real attack would come from the Romney road.
Early on Sunday morning, I ordered Captain Morgan, of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with a detachment of two companies of that regiment, to proceed out the Pughtown road as far as Pughtown, if practicable; thence across to the Romney road, and by that road back to the forts. I instructed him to carefully observe the disposition and forces of the enemy, if any, in that direction. That officer returned with his command to the forts about 2 p.m., and reported that he had made the round indicated without meeting or detecting any traces of an enemy in that direction. Immediately west of and parallel with the ridge on which the main fortification is constructed, and about 2,000 yards distant therefrom, is another range, known as Flint Ridge, on which there was in process of construction a line of earthworks, which commanded the Pughtown and Romney roads and all the approaches from the west. These works were occupied on Sunday by the One hundred and tenth and part of the One hundred and sixteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Battery L, Fifth U.S. Artillery, under Colonel Keifer.
The report of Captain Morgan relieved me from all apprehension of an immediate attack in that direction, and induced me to turn my attention to the approaches in other directions. I am still at a loss to know how Captain Morgan could have made the tour which he reported without seeing or encountering the enemy, for within two hours after he made his report the enemy opened upon me from the west with at least four full batteries, some of his guns of the longest range, under cover of which fire he precipitated a column of infantry, at least 10,000 strong, upon the outwork held by Colonel Keller, which, after a stubborn resistance, he carried. This outwork was commanded by the guns of the main and star forts, which were immediately brought to bear upon the enemy, driving him from the position, and affording a protection to Colonel Keifer's command, [ar44/Page 47] under which it retreated, with small loss, to the main fort. The guns at the fort, and the Baltimore battery, Captain Alexander, at the star fort, and Carlin's battery, immediately south of the main fort, engaged the guns of the enemy, and an artillery contest ensued, which was maintained with energy on both sides until 8 o'clock in the evening. During its progress, I massed my troops in the main and star forts and in the rifle-pits in front of them. To my regret, the enemy made no effort to take my position by assault.
About 9 o'clock in the evening, I convened a council of war, consisting of Brigadier-General Elliott, commanding First Brigade, Colonel Ely, commanding Second Brigade, and Colonel McReynolds, commanding Third Brigade. Before stating the result of this council, it is proper that I should state the circumstances by which we were surrounded. It was certain that Lee had eluded the Army of the Potomac, and was at liberty to use his whole force against us without hinderance from any source. Our position at Winchester, although affording facilities for defense which would enable an inferior to maintain itself against a superior number for a limited time, could not be successfully defended by the limited means at my command against such an army as surrounded me. Six principal roads, known in the army as the Romney, Pughtown, Martinsburg, Berryville, Front Royal, and Strasburg roads, lead into the town. The names of these roads indicate their course. They are all intersected and connected by cross-roads in close proximity to the town. Cavalry and artillery can approach the town and the forts from every direction. We had but one day's ration, left, and our artillery ammunition was almost entirely exhausted. On Monday morning the enemy could have brought one hundred guns to bear on us, to which we could have made no reply. Precedents which have occurred during this rebellion and in other countries would have justified a capitulation; but I thought, and my comrades in council thought, that we owed our lives to the Government rather than make such a degrading concession to rebels in arms against its authority. The propositions concluded upon in that council were, that in consequence of the entire exhaustion of our artillery ammunition, it was impossible to hold the post against the overwhelming forces of the enemy, and that a further prolongation of the defense could only result in sacrificing the lives of our soldiers without any practical benefit to the country; that we owed it to the honor of the Federal arms to make an effort to force our way through the lines of the beleaguering foe; that the artillery and wagons should be abandoned, and the division, brigade, and regimental quartermasters instructed to bring away all public horses, and that the brigades, in the order of their numbers, should march from the forts at 1 o'clock in the morning, carrying with them their arms and the usual supply of ammunition.
The Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry was attached to the Third Brigade. The forts were evacuated at the time designated, and immediately thereafter the cannon spiked and the ammunition which could not be carried by the soldiers thrown into the cisterns of the forts. The column proceeded through a ravine, avoiding the town of Winchester, about 1 mile, until it struck the Martinsburg road. It then proceeded up the Martinsburg road to where a road leads from it to Summit Station, about 4½ miles from Winchester, when I received a message from General Elliott that he was attacked by the enemy's skirmishers. I had heard the firing, and was riding forward. The enemy was on elevated ground in a woods east of the road and [ar44/Page 48] a field east of and adjoining the woods. This occurred between 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning. General Elliott immediately filed the One hundred and twenty-third, One hundred and tenth, and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio Regiments to the left, and formed them in line of battle west of and in front of the woods in which the enemy was posted. He then advanced the One hundred and tenth Ohio. Colonel Keifer, into the woods, to feel the enemy. This regiment soon became actively engaged, and was immediately supported by the One hundred and twenty-second Ohio, which promptly took its position on the right of the One hundred and tenth.
It soon became evident that the enemy was present in considerable force, with at least two batteries of artillery. It was evident, however, that a retreat could not be effected excepting under cover of a heavy contest with him. The One hundred and tenth and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio maintained the contest for over an hour, occasionally falling back, but in the main driving the enemy. They captured one of the enemy's caissons, and silenced two of his guns by killing his gunners and his artillery horses. Although immediately under the guns of the enemy, they preserved their lines, and kept up an incessant, heavy, and murderous fire of musketry, under the effect of which the enemy's right flank fell into disorder and recoiled.
During this contest, Colonel Keifer especially distinguished himself by the display of the qualities of a brave soldier and a judicious and skillful officer.
About the time the contest commenced on my left, by my orders the Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry, Colonel Schall, advanced against the enemy's left, but was soon driven back. I then supported the Eighty-seventh by the Eighteenth Connecticut, and the two regiments, under Colonel Ely, again advanced into the woods, but were again driven back. I then supported Colonel Ely with the One hundred and twenty-third Ohio, and again advanced the line, but it was repulsed with inconsiderable loss, the range of the enemy's guns being so elevated as to render his artillery inefficient.
At this time a signal gun fired at Winchester announced the approach of the enemy in my rear. Colonel Ely's command was again rallied, and formedin line of battle west of the Martinsburg road, and that officer again directed to engage the enemy.
At this time the One hundred and tenth and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiments were still maintaining their fire on the left with unabating energy. I then gave instructions that my forces unengaged and trains should retreat under cover of the contest, taking the Martinsburg road for a short distance, and then turning to the right. I instructed my staff officers, excepting Captain Baird, who was engaged with the One hundred and tenth and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, on my left, to diligently convey these instructions. They were conveyed to Colonel Washburn, commanding the One hundred and sixteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Colonel Klunk, commanding the Twelfth West Virginia Infantry; Major Adams, commanding First New York Cavalry, and Major Titus, commanding Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry. These forces immediately marched, but, instead of taking the route indicated, took a road which leads to the left, through Bath, in Morgan County. They were followed by considerable bodies of the Eighteenth Connecticut and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania, and some stragglers from the One hundred and twenty- third, [ar44/Page 49] One hundred and tenth, and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Colonel Ely was instructed to fall back and retreat as soon as the troops had passed his rear. Major John L.] McGee and Captain Palmer, of my staff, who were at different times dispatched to Colonel McReynolds with his instructions, each separately reported that they could not find that officer or any portion of his command, excepting Major Adams, with the First New York Cavalry. It was supposed that during the battle he had retreated to the right of the Martinsburg road.
About the time that I had given the directions above indicated, my horse was shot under me. Some time intervened before I could be remounted. When remounted, I went in the direction of the One hundred and tenth and the One hundred and twenty-second Ohio, and met them falling back by the Martinsburg road.
The retreat was now in full progress--the two columns by different routes--and it was impossible to unite them. I proceeded with the One hundred and tenth and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio Regiments, and fragments of other regiments which followed after them. This portion of the command, by way of Smithfield, arrived at Harper's Ferry late in the afternoon of Monday. I was not pursued. The column that proceeded in the direction of Bath-crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and subsequently massed at Bloody Run, 2, 700 strong.
Having no report from Colonel McReynolds, I am unable to state the operations of his brigade on Monday morning. That officer arrived at Harper's Ferry about 12 m. on Monday, unaccompanied by any considerable portion of his command. The Sixth Maryland Infantry, attached to his brigade, arrived at that place Monday evening, almost intact. His other infantry regiment, the Sixty-seventh Pennsylvania, was principally captured.
I have learned that while Colonel Ely was endeavoring to retreat, in pursuance to directions, he was surrounded, and compelled to surrender, with the greater portion of the command which he led in the last charge.
The force which we encountered on Monday morning in our front was Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, from 8,000 to 10,000 strong. The whole number of my division which have reported at Harper's Ferry and Bloody Run and other places exceeds 5,000. The stragglers scattered through the country are perhaps 1,000. My loss in killed and wounded cannot be large.
It is not my object at this time to bestow praise or cast censure, but I feel it to be my duty to say that during the late operations near Winchester generally the officers and men under my command conducted themselves with distinguished gallantry and deserve well of their country. If they could be again united (as they should be) under their appropriate brigade and regimental organizations, they would be formidable on any field.
It is proper that I should here refer again to the instructions under which I occupied Winchester. They were not materially changed from those above given until Thursday, June 11, 12 o'clock at night, when I received from Colonel Platt, at Harper's Ferry, the following telegram:
In accordance with orders from Halleck, received from headquarters at Baltimore today, you will immediately take steps to remove your command from Winchester to Harper's Ferry. You will, without delay, call in Colonel McReynolds and such other outposts not necessary for observation at the front. Send back your heavy [4 R R--VOL XXVII, PT lI/Page 50] guns, surplus ammunition, and subsistence, retaining only such force and arms as will constitute what General Halleck designates as a lookout, which can readily and without inconvenience fall back to Harper's Ferry.
DONN PIATT,
Lieutenant-Colonel, and Chief of Staff.I immediately telegraphed to Major-General Schenck as follows:
I have the place well protected, and am well prepared to hold it, as General Tyler and Colonel Piatt will inform you, and I can and would hold it, if permitted to do so, against any force the rebels can afford to bring against me, and I exceedingly regret the prospect of having to give it up It will b cruel to abandon the loyal people in this country to tim rebel fiends again.R. H. MILROY,
Major-General.Early on Friday morning, June 12, I received this telegram:
BALTIMORE, MD., June 12, 1863--1 a.m.Maj. Gen. R. H. MILROY:
Lieutenant-Colonel Platt, as I learn by copy of dispatch sent me, which he forwarded to you from Harper's Ferry, misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded his instructions. You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but hold your position in the meantime. Be ready for movement, but await further orders. I doubt the propriety of calling in McReynolds' brigade at once. If you should fall back to Harper's Ferry, he will be in part on the way and covering your flank; but use your discretion as to any order to him.
Below I give you a copy of the telegram of the General-in-Chief. Nothing heard since. Give me constant information.
ROBT. C. SCHENCK,
;Major-General, Commanding.
[Copy of General Halleck's telegram.]
[WASHINGTON, June 11, 1863---12 p.m.]Harper's Ferry is the important place. Winchester is of no importance other than as a lookout. The Winchester troops, excepting enough to serve as an outpost, should be withdrawn to Harper's Ferry. [The troops at Martinsburg should also be ready to fall back on Harper's Ferry.] No large amount of supplies should be left in any exposed position.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in. Chief.Late on Friday evening received a dispatch from General Schenck, which is lost, but which was in substance as follows:
A dispatch just received from Colonel Don Piatt says: "I read Halleck's last dispatch by the light of his of April 30, and considered it a positive order to fall back to Harper's Ferry, and I so ordered Milroy. I have been on the ground, and gave it advisedly. Milroy cannot move from his present position in presence of the enemy. He has not transportation enough to move in face of the enemy, and has not cavalry he can rely upon to scout beyond Strasburg." What are your facilities for transportation?This telegram I immediately answered as follows:
I can at any time, if not cut off from Martinsburg, have sufficient transportation to take all public stores from here in six hours.
R. H. MILROY,
Major-General.Late on Friday night, June 12, perhaps about 10 o'clock, I sent Major-General Schenck this dispatch, to wit:
The Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry had a slight skirmish with a rebel cavalry force of about 500, 12 miles from here, on the Front Royal road, this afternoon. The Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry and Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania Infantry., with one section of artillery, had a splendid little skirmish with some 400 rebel cavalry [ar44/Page 51] this side of Middletown at the same time. The Thirteenth skirmished with the rebels a short time, and drew them into an ambuscade of the Eighty-seventh and artillery. Eight of the rebels were killed and a number wounded, and 37, including a captain and 2 lieutenants, were taken prisoners. No casualties on our side.
The enemy is probably approaching in some force. Please state specifically whether I am to abandon this place or not.
R. H. MILROY,
Major-General.To this communication no reply was received. [See note attached.] It is clear that I received no order to evacuate Winchester, excepting that of Colonel Piatt, which was annulled by the telegram of Major-General Schenck on Friday, the 12th. The telegram above copied of the General-in-Chief was before me, but that is advisory in its tone, and I in common with General Schenck did not construe it as amounting to an order, or as indicating that immediate compliance was intended. I rather construed it as indicating the course which should be pursued upon an emergency yet to happen. This telegram, although sent as late as Thursday, the 11th, must have been written in the absence of all knowledge of the impending emergency; otherwise language calculated to hasten my action would have been used. The language contained in my telegram expressive of my confidence in my ability to hold Winchester was used with reference to any contingency which would probably happen. I did not mean that I could hold it against such an army as that which I knew to be at the disposal of General Lee, and it was no part of my duty to watch the movements of that army, My limited cavalry force did not enable me to scout beyond the Blue Ridge.
That army was faced, however, by the Army of the Potomac, between the headquarters of which and my own, by way of Washington, a continuous line of telegraphic communication existed. I believed that Lee could not move his large army, with its immense artillery and baggage trains, and perform a six days' march in my direction, unless I received timely notice of the important fact. The immense cavalry force at the disposal of General Hooker strengthened this confidence. Therefore, on Friday, when I perceived indications of the approach of the enemy in some force on the Front Royal road, I felt confident that it was composed of the forces which I had faced, or that the expected cavalry expedition of General Stuart was in progress.
Acting upon this belief, I regarded it as my duty to remain at my post at Winchester.
Lee's army, in parallel columns, once across the passes of the Blue Ridge, from the direction of Front Royal, it was impossible for me to retreat upon either Martinsburg or Harper's Ferry without encountering it. I could not at any time after Friday have retreated without encountering it, and I had no knowledge of its presence, as above stated, until late Saturday, when I learned it from prisoners.
After all, it may well be doubted whether the three days' delay, and the loss which my presence at Winchester occasioned the rebel army, were not worth to the country the sacrifice which they cost it.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
R. H. MILROY,
Major-General.
Lieut. Col. DONN PIATT,
Chief of Staff, Eighth Army Corps.[ar44/Page 52] [NOTE.--My telegraph operator at Winchester had just commenced receiving a cipher dispatch on Saturday, the 13th, when the wire was cut between that and Martinsburg by the rebels, and nothing could be made of what was received. I have since learned from General Schenck that that dispatch was an order to me to fall back immediately to Harper's Ferry.
R. H. MILROY,
Major-General.
[Telegram referred to in General Milroy's report.]WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, April 30, 1863--11 a.m.
Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore, Md.:If you want more troops in the west and at Harper's Ferry, why do you leave so large a force at Winchester? As I have often repeated to you verbally and in writing, that is no place to fight a battle. It is merely an outpost, which should not be exposed to an attack in force.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
[Indorsement.]HDQRS. MIDDLE DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, July 8, 1863.Respectfully forwarded to the General-in-Chief, in obedience to instructions from the War Department.
When Major-General Milroy was relieved at Bloody Run, and sent by Major-General Couch to report here on the 27th June ultimo, I placed him in arrest.
Eight days having elapsed without charges being sent to be served on him, his arrest expired by limitation of law on the 5th instant, since which he has made his report.He was deprived of all command at Harper's Ferry immediately, in pursuance of the order of the General-in-Chief on the 15th of June ultimo.
If it be not the purpose of the Secretary of War or the General-in-Chief to take further measures in General Milroy's case, I respectfully request that he be ordered back to the command of those of his troops which were assembled at Bloody Run, and which are now operating, I believe, somewhere in the rear of the rebel army.I really do not think that anybody else can so efficiently bring together and manage those fragments of his division, and have them ready for reuniting with the other scattered parts of brigades, regiments, and companies when the present immediate movements against the enemy are over.
ROBT. C. SCHENCK,
Major-General.O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44] Page 197
JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The Gettysburg Campaign.
No. 400.--Record of a Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the evacuation of Winchester and Martinsburg.OCTOBER 27, 1863.
In June last a division was substantially lost at and near Winchester, Va. At the time, it was under General Milroy as immediate commander in the field, General Schenck as department commander at Baltimore, and General Halleck as General-in-Chief at Washington.
General Milroy, as immediate commander, was put in arrest, and subsequently a court of inquiry examined chiefly with reference to disobedience of orders, and reported the evidence.
The foregoing is a synoptical statement of the evidence, together with the Judge-Advocate-General's conclusions. The disaster, when it came, was a surprise to all. It was very well known to Generals Schenck and Milroy for some time before that General Halleck thought the division was in great danger of a surprise at Winchester; that it was of no service commensurate with the risk it incurred, and that it ought to be withdrawn; but, although he more than once advised its withdrawal, he never positively ordered it. General Schenck, on the contrary, believed the service of the force at Winchester was worth the hazard, and so did not positively order its withdrawal until it was so late that the enemy cut the wire and prevented the order reaching General Milroy.
General Milroy seems to have concurred with General Schenck in the opinion that the force should be kept at Winchester at least until the approach of danger, but he disobeyed no order upon the subject.
Some question can be made whether some of General Halleck's dispatches to General Schenck should not have been construed to be orders to withdraw the force, and obeyed accordingly; but no such question can be made against General Milroy. In fact, the last order he received was to be prepared to withdraw, but not to actually withdraw until further order, which further order never reached him.
Serious blame is not necessarily due to any serious disaster, and I cannot say that in this case any of the officers are deserving of serious blame. No court-martial is deemed necessary or proper in the case.
A. LINCOLN.
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